Abstract -I use the results of a survey on the adoption patterns of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) 
INTRODUCTION
A necdotal evidence (Chapman, 1998; Fay, 1989; Porter, 1989) suggests that tax and expenditure limits adopted by states in the 1970s have led to a proliferation of special assessment districts. Generally, a special assessment district is a sub-municipal entity that levies taxes on a geographically small district and uses the revenues to fund local improvements in that district. By levying taxes only on districts constructed to directly benefi t from those levies, special assessment districts avoid tax revolt strictures. Despite the growing importance of these districts, basic patterns of adoption are unknown. Indeed, because these districts are not surveyed by the Census of Governments, their adoption patterns are a mystery to researchers (see Briffault (1999) for the state of knowledge on special assessment districts).
1 More broadly, special assessment districts are part of a long research interest in the determinants and consequences of provision
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of local public goods (Tiebout, 1956; Epple and Romano, 1996; Helsley and Strange, 1999; Cheung, 2006) .
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This paper begins to fill the gap in knowledge about sub-municipal public goods provision by presenting the results of a survey of California cities describing the adoption patterns of one particular form of special assessment district: the Business Improvement District (BID). In California, a BID is formed when a group of merchants or property owners vote in favor of a package of taxation and local public services. Once a majority of assessment-weighted votes are cast in favor, state law makes the contributions of all neighborhood members mandatory. BIDs provide local public goods such as cleaning, marketing and safety, and are of interest because quantitative analysis shows they have been able to reduce crime in Los Angeles and Philadelphia (Brooks, 2006b; Calanog, 2004; Hoyt, 2005a) and increase property values in New York City (Ellen, Schwartz and Voicu, 2006) . In addition, anecdotal evidence credits them with a myriad of neighborhood improvements (Houston, Jr., 2003) .
Previous work has surveyed existing BIDs (Mitchell, 2001 ) to determine services and goals, relying on the list of BIDs compiled by the International Downtown Association. While this list likely includes most of the largest BIDs, it is unreliable as a comprehensive survey of BID adoption. To completely capture BID adoption patterns, this paper offers the fi rst comprehensive survey of adoption patterns by city, the jurisdiction that authorizes BIDs in California. I fi nd that roughly half of California cities with a population of at least 25,000 in 1980 have BIDs. Among the sample of all cities in the four largest Southern California counties, almost one-fi fth have at least one BID.
What motivates BID adoption at the city level? I propose and test supply-and demand-side hypotheses. On the demand side, recent work has suggested that more heterogeneous cities should be more likely to either supplement or opt out of government provision (Alesina, Baquir and Easterly, 1999; Chaudhary, 2005; Poterba, 1997; Temple, 1996) . The intuition behind this prediction is that heterogeneous residents may have diffi culty agreeing upon a public good of mutual interest.
In contrast, the supply-side hypothesis is motivated by the work of Olson (1971) , who argues that even groups with common goals face a collective action problem in the provision of public goods. In commercial clusters, local public goods of mutual interest include security, cleanliness and parking. One way to overcome collective action problems in providing these local public goods is an institution that coerces membership. In newer commercial development, such as malls, coercive force is applied by the developer who prices externalities into rental contracts (Gould and Pashigian, 1998) . In contrast, urban planners have long noted that older commercial areas have no counterpart for the mall developer. Thus, the theory of collective action argues that the BID institution should solve the problem of an inadequate level of public goods only in non-mall commercial areas, which are predominantly in older commercial neighborhoods and cities.
By combining the data from the survey of BIDs with demographic, government and economic data, I test whether these two hypotheses-and the two in conjunction-can explain BID adoption. I fi nd that the only persistently signifi cant explanation for BID adoption lies on the supply side: a 30-year decrease in city age lowers the likelihood of adopting a BID by 15 percent. More limited evidence suggests that the interaction of heterogeneity and community age also explains BID adoption, and is consistent with both the supply-and demand-sides of the theory.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Consider that BID adoption is a function of both a demand for BID-like services-heterogeneity-and a supply of BID-resolvable difficulties-those problems created by older neighborhoods. On the demand side, I modify the Alesina et al. (1999) model to explain why the heterogeneity of residents should also apply to fi rms-which BIDs are-and not just residents. The Alesina et al. model posits a jurisdiction without mobility, where individuals have preferences over the amount and type of a public good. The jurisdiction chooses its level of public goods fi rst by voting on the size of the public good and then by voting on the type. In equilibrium, as tastes for the public good become more heterogeneous, the jurisdiction provides less of the public goods.
To modify the model, I associate citizens in Alesina's world not just with a city, but also with a neighborhood. In addition, I add two not terribly restrictive assumptions. First, assume that the fi rms of interest are retail businesses. This conforms very closely with the actual composition of BIDs. Second, assume that fi rms serve local residents and local public goods such as crime prevention and cleanliness are an important part of the retail shopping experience. Specifi cally, assume that fi rms' profi ts are decreasing in the difference between the municipally provided level of the public good and the locally desired level of the public good. Retailers' profi t increases as the difference between the municipally chosen level of public good and each neighborhood resident's desired level of public good shrinks; more public goods than desired is not harmful. From the Alesina et al. (1999) model, we know that the amount of the public good provided by the city declines in consumer heterogeneity. 4 Because fi rms' profi ts are increasing in the public good, fi rms are more desirous of supplementing the municipally provided level of public goods when the residential population of a city is heterogeneous. In sum, the Alesina et al. (1999) model suggests that more heterogeneous cities are more likely to have supplemental provision of local public goods. Note that in the present case, residents' heterogeneity impacts fi rm decisions because residents determine the level of public goods to which fi rms respond.
This conclusion is the commercial correlate to that tested in the literature investigating school district consolidation; most, but not all, research fi nds that if the consolidated school district will be more heterogeneous than its initial parts, a merger is less likely (Gordon and Knight, 2006; Brasington, 1999; Kenny and Schmidt, 1994) . BIDs differ from school districts, however, in that BIDs supplement municipal services, while school districts are sole providers.
On the supply side, suppose that BIDs resolve a collective action problem in the provision of local public goods in a neighborhood of fi rms. For example, each fi rm in a neighborhood would prefer that the street were cleaner, but no fi rm fi nds it profi table to clean the entire street alone. Because a clean street is a local public good for fi rms, each fi rm is reluctant to make a commitment to cleaning without a binding commitment from all other fi rms. Without a binding commitment, a suboptimally clean street--perhaps even a very dirty one--is provided.
Note that this collective action problem arises only when the number of fi rms is large and when an actor to internalize externalities is lacking. In the urban context, these two elements are closely correlated with the era of development. In older commercial neighborhoods, fi rms lease from individual property owners. In addition, older neighborhoods have a large number of stores in a small geographic area. In effect, this means that older commercial neighborhoods experience larger positive externalities from and greater economies of scale in local public goods provision than newer commercial neighborhoods.
In newer commercial neighborhoods, firms are typically agglomerated into shopping malls, strip malls or big box centers. In these newer developments, a single developer writes a contract with his many tenants to provide the public goods at issue, in effect internalizing the externalities. Gould and Pashigian (1998) show that developers write lease contracts for malls to effi ciently allocate space and internalize externalities, such as those generated by anchor stores. In big box developments, where each store provides a wide variety of goods, the number of fi rms is smaller than in older commercial neighborhoods, and firms may be dispersed over a wide geographic area. Therefore, the BID institution is of use only in older commercial areas; if newer commercial developments are providing sub-optimal levels of public goods, it is not because they have failed to overcome the collective action problem.
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In sum, theory suggests that BID adoption should occur in highly heterogeneous cities and in cities with older commercial stock. In particular, BID adoption should be highest in cities where these two factors work in tandem, and I will explore this interaction empirically.
BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS
Because BID legislation varies by state, this study focuses on one large stateCalifornia-in order to look at adoption patterns within an otherwise constant institutional environment. California has had some variant of a BID law on the books since the 1950s, when the state allowed for the taxation of merchants by district to provide parking lots. Over the years, the state has broadened the mandate of these BIDs. In 1989 the state expanded the mandate of permitted services from mostly parking to include marketing and various neighborhood improvements. A major law change in 1995 expanded potential assessees from solely merchants to include commercial property owners and expanded allowable services to security and other larger structural improvements. This new law escapes the stringencies of California's Proposition 13 by calling the tax described below an assessment, and BID professionals are always careful to refer to the tax as an assessment. Taxation of residents or residential properties is explicitly forbidden in all versions of the law.
In order to establish a BID, commercial property or business owners in a neighborhood decide upon a boundary, assessment schedule and budget for the district. Any group of merchants of commercial property owners in a neighborhood is eligible to form a BID, and merchants and property owners are free to defi ne their neighborhood as they see fi t. The only barrier posed by the BID authorizing legislation is that individual properties or merchants should not be carved out of districts. After deciding on goals for the BID, BID proponents then attempt to convince others in the potential BID that they, too, should support the BID.
The city administers formal voting, and votes are weighted by assessment.
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Commercial properties or businesses in BIDs may be assessed in any way commensurate with the benefi ts that property receives. The form of the assessment is chosen by the BID proponents and, thus, varies by each individual BID. Usually the assessment of properties is some combination of dollars per building square footage, lot square footage, and front footage; for fi rms it is frequently a percentage of the city's business license tax. If a majority of assessment-weighted votes are cast in favor of the BID-which is the entire bundle of boundaries, assessments and expenditures for the one-to-fi ve-year life of the BID-it is established and taxes are mandatory for all merchant owners within the district. The BID then functions as a not-for-profi t corporation. Merchant BIDs renew every year, but effectively continue until voters representing a majority of the assessed value protest. Property BIDs renew every three to fi ve years with a new vote, budget, and assessment scheme. BIDs are quite small. For the city of Los Angeles, I have complete information on each individual BID and offer information on Los Angeles BIDs in 2002 as illustration. In the city of Los Angeles, BIDs are usually much smaller than a square kilometer and the total area of all BIDs accounts for less than two percent of the city's land area. In general, BIDs pass by wide margins; from 1995 to 2002, the lowest margin of passage was two-thirds, and margins of passage are more commonly around 80 percent. As of 2002, no city of Los Angeles BID had failed to pass at the voting stage. Interviews with BID staff and proponents suggest this is because BIDs are perceived to require a super-majority for effective action. If proponents suspect that a super-majority is not forthcoming, they will not invest time and effort in mounting a campaign (see Brooks (2006b) for further details).
In 2002 Thus, though BID expenditures may be small in total, they are locally substantial, sometimes outpacing the city's own expenditures.
The very existence of a BID-like entity is strong evidence that neighborhoods have diffi culty providing public goods without a coercive mechanism, as theorized by Olson (1971) . 10 Of the 253 cities sampled for this paper, slightly less than one-third had at least one BID in 2000.
DATA AND ESTIMATION
The primary data for this research comes from a survey I conducted of 253 cities in California. This sample includes all 114 cities with a population of over 25,000 people in 1980 and the universe of cities in San Diego, Riverside, Orange and Los Angeles counties, which account for an additional 123 cities.
11 By having data on both large cities and a geographically homogeneous group of small cities, the research can yield conclusions about two types of cities. For each city, I asked how many BIDs of each type (merchant or property) the city had, and if there were any BIDs, what year the earliest BID was adopted. I fi rst searched for the existence of BIDs in each city online. If that search did not produce any evidence of a BID, I searched the city's own webpage to fi nd information about BIDs. Always as a supplement, and if neither of these methods revealed any information, as it frequently did not, I called or emailed the city to ask an economic development offi cial about BIDs in that city, 12 and took that offi cial's word as the fi nal say.
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Through repeated calling, this survey has a 97 percent response rate, so it reliably covers the universe of cities surveyed.
14 The third row of Table 2 shows mean BID adoption by group: among Southern California cities, roughly one-fi fth have any BIDs; for larger cities, the share is roughly half. In both groups, as shown in the fourth row of Table 2 , BID-adopting cities are more populous than the non-adopting cities, though the bias is less strong in the sample of larger cities.
To give a sense of BID prevalence, Table 1 lists the 20 largest cities in California, and shows that only seven do not have any BIDs. All of the fi ve largest cities-Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, San Francisco and Long Beach-shave BIDs, as do eight of the ten largest. The oldest BID among this sample started in 1966 in Modesto.
In order to evaluate whether supply-or demand-side factors lead to BID adoption, I combine the survey data with data from a variety of sources. Because the survey data include year of BID adoption, I am able to construct a panel of observations at the city-year level with a maximum of three observations per city. From the 1980, 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses, I add data on population, income, race, and household and housing characteristics. From the 1977 From the , 1987 From the , and 1997 To measure the demand-side variable of interest, residential heterogeneity, I calculate the index of fragmentation or Herfindahl index, H, for correlates of demand for public goods: income, education and race. 15 Residential heterogeneity, as opposed to fi rm heterogeneity, determines the initial level of public goods set by the city to which fi rms respond. This index is calculated as
where n is the number of groups (e.g., income categories) and s i is the share of each group in the population. For example, if a city is 1/3 low income, 1/3 medium income and 1/3 high income, the city has H = 1/3; if all citizens are high income, H = 1. Thus, the index goes from zero to one, where a heterogeneous city with population split equally between a large number of groups has an index approaching zero, and a homogeneous city with all members in one group has an index of one. 16 Prior research (Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby, 2004; Vidgor, 2004) has found racial heterogeneity to be more predictive of lowered levels of public goods than heterogeneity of income or education. However, because the public goods at issue here are those which are important to fi rms, and possibly less redistributional in nature, it is plausible that racial heterogeneity should be less salient in this instance than heterogeneity of income or education. To measure the supply side of BID adoption, I use two variables that capture the quantity of older commercial infrastructure, and denote their vector as age i,t . First, the Census measures the era of residential construction by neighborhood, and I use this to construct the share of residential buildings constructed after 1940 by city. Unfortunately, this measure does not contain much variance. For the sample of larger cities, the 10 th to 90 th percentile range is 0.78 to 0.99, and for the Southern California sample, it is 0.81 to 0.995, with a mean of 0.95. In addition, while the age of commercial structures should be correlated with the age of residential structures, the relationship may be weak.
The ideal measure of a city's age of commercial infrastructure would be the era when the size of property parcels and the size and shape of the street grid were formed. Following the work of Duany and Plater-Zyberk (1991) and, for great cities, Jacobs (1961) , these variables determine how fi rms and properties relate economically to one another, and how they jointly demand local public goods. Smaller blocks, designed for walking cities, require smaller parcels; smaller parcels imply more buildings and more merchants. Because the census data capture only the age of currently existing construction, they obscure the initial era of development, which is when diffi cult-to-change decisions about street grid and parcel size are made. However, cities choose to incorporate in part to have control over exactly these elements of land use regulation, and the year of incorporation is observable.
Thus, the second and preferred measure of the age of commercial infrastructure, likely more closely correlated with the collective action costs commercial neighborhoods face, is a city's year of incorporation. Indeed, even while buildings are replaced, infrastructure, in the form of the street grid and property parcels, is much more costly to replace. To test whether a city's year of incorporation is correlated in any meaningful way to the initial era of development, I use information from the Los Angeles County Assessor's Offi ce on the age of all structures in the 87 cities in Los Angeles County as of 1999. For each city, I know the age of the primary building on each individual property. If the year of incorporation is a good measure of the era of initial commercial development, a city's year of incorporation should be correlated with lower percentiles in that city's distribution of building age. This is indeed the case: among the 87 cities in Los Angeles County, the correlation between the year of incorporation and fi fth percentile of the building age distribution is 0.59; the correlation with the tenth percentile is 0.55. Among the 30 cities in Los Angeles County with over 50,000 people in 1980, the correlations are even stronger-0.68 and 0.70, respectively. Thus, particularly for larger cities, year of incorporation tracks closely the city's initial era of development.
Combining these measures, I determine the impact of supply and demand factors on BID adoption at the city level by estimating
[1] Pr(BID i,t = 1|het i,t , age i , controls i,t , year t ) = Φ(α 0 + α 1 het i,t + α 2 age i + α 3 controls i,t + α 4,t year t ).
Observations are at the city-year level, and the binary choice of whether or not city i has any BIDs at time t, BID i,t , is determined by a measure of heterogeneity, het i,t , a vector measure of city age, age i , a vector of demographic, institutional and business controls, controls i,t , and year dummies, year t . I use the year dummies to control for area-wide shocks such as the decline of the aerospace industry, which could affect the regional provision of public goods. Heterogeneity is decreasing from zero to one, so if it is associated with BID adoption, α 1 will be negative. Age is measured by the city's year of incorporation and the share of residential buildings constructed after 1940; if older infrastructure is associated with BID adoption, α 2 should be less than zero.
Note that the estimation does not include city fi xed effects. Across the heterogeneity variables, the variance between cities is usually roughly double the variance within cities. Also, conceptually, restricting the model with city-level fi xed effects would require all identifi cation of BID adoption to come from changes within a city, whereas the theory concentrates on a city's long-term level of heterogeneity.
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Using fi xed effects would also preclude including a city's year of incorporation, which does not vary over time.
In order to estimate the joint impact of the supply-and demand-side factors, I use two interactions. An interaction is preferred to summing the two linear effects, because it is theoretically quite plausible that BIDs arise only when both the supply-and demand-side factors are present together. In such an event, the individual coeffi cients would not follow a linear function, and their sum would be misleading. The fi rst interaction is, thus, between heterogeneity and the year of incorporation: H * incorp i,t . If heterogeneity and city age only explain BID adoption together, then the coeffi cient on the interaction should be negative and signifi cant, while the main effects may be zero.
The second interaction to estimate the joint impact of heterogeneity and city age is an interaction of dummy variables, which I use to pinpoint where I expect the impact on BID adoption to be strongest. For the measure of heterogeneity, I create two dummy variables: one if the measure is in the top half, H high , of the distribution and one if the measure is in the bottom half, H low . Similarly, I construct two dummies for the age distribution, incorp new and incorp old . Theory suggests that BID adoption should be most prevalent where supply-and demand-side factors interact, or when a city is old and heterogeneity is high. This pair is one of the four combinations of dummy interactions: H low and new incorporation year, H high and new incorporation year, H low and old incorporation year, and H high and old incorporation year. Thus, if BID adoption is compelled by a supply-and demand-side interaction, the coeffi cient on the fi nal dummy interaction should be positive and signifi cant.
Ideally, the outcome variable would measure not just the presence of any BID, but the strength and extent of BIDs in a city. Unfortunately, my survey data are inadequate to describe the geographic or fi scal extent of these BIDs. The data are also inadequate to describe the extent of BIDs within a city: the most likely determinant of the number of BIDs is the number of older commercial neighborhoods, for which I have no good measure. Table 2 show that BID cities are, on average, more populous and have higher per-capita city government expenditures than non-BID cities. Among the Southern California cities, the mean population of cities with BIDs is roughly five times the mean population of cities without BIDs. Among the larger cities, cities with BIDs, at a mean population of 220,000, are roughly twice the size of the non-BID cities. No clear pattern or differences emerge in median family income between BID-and non-BID cities.
RESULTS

Summary statistics in Panel A of
The remainder of the Turning to the estimation, Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation [1] for all larger cities in California, focusing on the heterogeneity of poverty; a later table will present results for all types of heterogeneity. Each column in each panel presents the results from a separate regression. The fi rst set of three regressions in Panel A considers the impact of heterogeneity (H) of poverty and share of residential construction post-1940 (column 1); H and year of incorporation (column 2); and the interaction of H and the year of incorporation (column 3). All coeffi cients are marginal effects at the mean of the regressors from probit estimations and control for the "basic" set of covariates: population and Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list.
its square, racial composition, household composition, income and characteristics of the city's business environment.
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Columns one and two show that heterogeneity marginally significantly explains BID adoption, and that the year of incorporation has more explanatory power for BID adoption than the share of post-1940 residential stock. Results not presented show that the pattern of the superior explanatory power of the year of incorporation persists even controlling for the share of post-1940 residential stock. For this reason, the bulk of the analysis focuses on the year of incorporation. Column 3 shows that adding the interaction between the measure of heterogeneity and the year of incorporation likely leads to multi-collinearity problems because the coeffi cient on heterogeneity increases 20 times.
Adding additional controls, institutional features in columns four through six, and crime and clearance rates in columns seven to nine, does not change the qualitative picture. Heterogeneity of poverty remains marginally signifi cant, but the year of incorporation remains persistently statistically significant in explaining BID adoption. All specifi cations with the interaction are plagued by multicollinearity. The coeffi cient on year of incorporation suggests that increasing a city's age by 30 years-the mean difference between BID and non-BID cities in the sample of larger cities-increases the likelihood of BID adoption by roughly 15 percentage points. This modest increase is large enough to predict that older cities have BIDs and newer ones do not.
The coeffi cient on heterogeneity is very large; a coeffi cient on an index from zero to one, explaining a dichotomous outcome, should be between zero and one, and this is not the case here. This is likely attributable to the fact that the measure of heterogeneity does not span the entire zero-one range. The 10 th -90 th percentile range for heterogeneity of poverty in the larger-cities sample is 0.32 (Los Angeles) to 0.75 (for reference, Beverly Hills is 0.72) and the equivalent range for the southern California sample is only slightly wider, going from 0.30 to 0.82. Thus, considering only plausible changes in the heterogeneity variable, the coeffi cient is more realistic. Changing from the heterogeneity of Beverly Hills to that of Los Angeles increases the likelihood of BID adoption by 54 percentage points. This is a large change in the likelihood of BID adoption, but it is relative to an implausibly large change in heterogeneity, which experiences only small changes with a city over time.
The specification using the interaction of dummy variables, presented in Panel B of Table 3 , looks more closely at the interaction obscured by problems of multi-collinearity in the top half of the table. This specifi cation includes three dummy variable interactions for whether heterogeneity is high and the city is old, heterogeneity is low and the city is old, and heterogeneity is high and the city is new. All coeffi cients are in reference to the omitted group-new, homogeneous cities-the theoretically least likely to form a BID. Theory suggests that the high-heterogeneity and old-year-of-incorporation interaction should best explain BID adoption at the city level, and this prediction is borne out in this table. Regardless of controls, the high-heterogeneity and low-incorporation-year combination has the largest coeffi cient, and the only statistically significant one. Being in the high-heterogeneity, low-incorporation-year group raises the likelihood of adopting a BID by more than a third.
Many potential confounding explanations for the relevance of a city's age are accounted for by the covariates. Older cities could plausibly adopt BIDs either 18 Please see the appendix for the detailed list of these covariates. because they function as retail hubs or retail deserts; however, the coefficient on age is robust to controlling for total and retail sales per capita. Older cities could be more likely to have institutions that make BID adoption desirable, but the coefficient on age is robust to the inclusion of controls for whether the city operates under homerule and whether the city uses a mayor-council system. Older cities could have more crime or poorer law enforcement, which could lead to BID adoption, but the age coeffi cient is robust to controlling for both the crime and clearance rates.
Do the dynamics that explain BID adoption for larger cities hold for the sample of all cities in four Southern California counties? Table 4 presents results for the same estimations as Table 3 with this different sample. As before, Panel A shows that, regardless of controls, age of incorporation explains BID adoption better than the share of post-1940 era residential construction. The coeffi cient on year of incorporation is roughly the same size as the coeffi cient from the previous table. As before, the specifi cation with the interaction creates large changes in the coeffi cients of the main effects and, thus, I hesitate to draw conclusions from that specifi cation. The bottom panel of Table 4 repeats the dummy variable specifi cation from the previous table. In the most complete specifi cation, I fail to fi nd any evidence that the high-heterogeneity, old-incorporation-year combination explains BID adoption better than either of the other combinations.
To test whether the interaction is signifi cant across different measures of heterogeneity, Table 5 presents results for heterogeneity of education, family income, age, household type, and race.
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The first column in each panel of the table repeats the results for heterogeneity of poverty from the previous tables. In the top panel, which presents results for all larger cities in California, the pattern of the preferred high-heterogeneity, low-incorporation-year dummy being the best explanation for BID adoption holds for two of the six specifi cations: those using the heterogeneity of poverty and age. For another two specifi cations, the low-heterogeneity, low-incorporation-year combination explains BID adoption equally as well as the preferred combination. For heterogeneity of education, the low-heterogeneity, low-incorporation-year combination best explains BID adoption. In the specifi cation using heterogeneity of race, none of the coeffi cients is signifi cant. Among Southern California cities, described in the bottom panel of Table 5 , no clear pattern among any of the three groups emerges.
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The sample analyzed here begins shortly after the passage of California's Proposition 13 in 1978, which restricts the ability of local governments to increase property tax revenues. Because the law restricts the growth of assessment values to the minimum of the rate of infl ation or two percent per year, newer properties are more likely to be assessed closer to their true market value, causing the restriction to bind more tightly on older cities. In addition, because the law allowed reassessment to market value upon sale, the law was more binding on cities with fewer movers, which may also be older cities. This poses a challenge to the identifi cation that I address below. In the world of special districts, researchers have not found increases in their numbers following the passage of Proposition 13 (Lewis, 1998) . 19 Results from the continuous specifi cation fi nd that BID adoption declines in city age and is generally increases statistically insignifi cantly in heterogeneity. 20 The continuous regressions, using BID intensity (BIDs/retail sales) as the outcome, have an insignifi cant negative coeffi cient on the incorporation year variable and a widely varying and extremely insignifi cant coeffi cient on the heterogeneity variable. For both the data and theoretical reasons discussed above, I do not expect the results to be as clean when adoption is the outcome. Table 3 and appendix for description of covariates. Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list. Table 3 notes and appendix for description of covariates.
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list. * Signifi cant at the 0.05% level. ** Signifi cant at the 0.01% level. Notes: Column 1 reports means above standard deviations; columns 2 to 10 report coeffi cients from estimating BID adoption on year of incorporation dummies and controls. See Table 3 and appendix for description of covariates. Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list.
To separately identify the impact of age and heterogeneity on BID adoption from the Proposition 13 effect, I add controls for the share of homes built in the last ten years, and the share of new owners in the last ten years. Results in Table 5 (and  in Table 6 ) are robust to these added controls. In addition, I construct an alternate measure of the strength of Proposition 13's impact from the Annual Survey of Government Finances: the ratio of 1980 property tax receipts to 1978 property tax receipts. Of the 152 cities for which I have data, only eight had more property tax receipts in 1980 than in 1978; the mean ratio is 0.77. I add this ratio as a measure of Proposition 13's strength by city, and results in Tables 5 and 6 are weakened but robust to its inclusion.
To further push the results on age of incorporation, I divide cities into four rough quartiles by year of incorporation and present results replacing the continuous variable with these dummies. If age matters, we should expect that the oldest cities should be most likely to adopt BIDs, and that the propensity to adopt a BID should decline in age. Furthermore, this approach provides a test of the claim that BIDs, instead of being a response to a collective action problem, are a response to a particular vintage of buildings. If BIDs were a response to a particular vintage, we would expect one point of the incorporation year distribution to stand out as the explanation for BID adoption.
The first column of Table 6 , reporting the raw percentages, shows that the oldest cities are the most likely to adopt BIDs. The remaining columns of the table present marginal probabilities from a probit model controlling for three measures of heterogeneity-that of poverty, education and family income-and the full set of controls from the previous tables. 21 The result continues to hold even 
CONCLUSIONS
The survey evidence presented here, the fi rst to systematically document adoption patterns of special assessment districts by city, shows that BIDs are widespread among larger cities in California, and prevalent but not extremely frequent among all cities in the four largest Southern California counties. In broad terms, these results tell us that BID adoption has become an increasingly frequent mechanism for the provision of local public goods and, thus, that the consequences of BID adoption-the quality of public goods they provide, and their impact on the distribution of public goods-are worthy of further study. The widespread prevalence of BIDs also suggests that the entire class of special assessment districts may have an importance not yet documented in the literature.
Contrasting supply-and demand-side explanations for BID adoption at the city level, I find that heterogeneity is, at best, an infrequent explanation for BID adoption. However, a city's year of incorporation is persistently signifi cantly associated with BID adoption, consistent 21 Results using the other heterogeneity variables, not pictured, are very similar.
with BIDs resolving a collective action problem endemic to older commercial neighborhoods. This market failure result speaks clearly to a role for public policy in resolving issues of urban decline.
More broadly, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that special assessment districts are plentiful enough to break the link between Tiebout sorting on taxes and public goods and the municipal boundary. In the present case, BIDs allow merchants and commercial property owners a tax and public goods choice not available from the city. This extra choice could plausibly allow cities to retain fi rms that would otherwise have left. In addition, the fact that half of larger cities have BIDs strongly hints that the special assessment district form may play an important role either now or in the future in the provision of local public goods not just for fi rms, but also for residents.
